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Asymmetrical Peremptories Defended: 
A Reply 
By Richard D. Friedman* 
Three years ago, with the publication of his article ''An Asymmet-
rical Approach to the Problem of Peremptories" in this journal, 
Professor Friedman initiated a debate on the subject that was taken 
up in 1994 by three prosecutors who offered a rebuttal that was also 
printed in these pages. Professor Friedman continues the debate. 
I am not surprised that three prosecutors-even such able and 
thoughtful advocates as Messrs. Helland, Light, and Richards-
regard as distasteful to the point of abhorrence my proposal that 
peremptory challenges be eliminated for the prosecution but 
retained for the defense. • For that matter, I am equally unsur-
prised that defense counsel seem to think this is a great idea. 
And perhaps the biggest nonsurprise is that I continue to adhere 
to my view. 
The prosecutors do not disagree with me that peremptories 
for the defense ought to . be retained; our debate is whether 
they ought to be retained for the prosecution. I concede the 
prosecutors' point that Batson has not yet made the administrative 
burden of prosecutorial peremptories intolerable. I suspect, 
though, that the prosecutors would not belittle that burden if they 
practiced in other jurisdictions, such as in the Deep South, where 
(for a combination of reasons ofhistory, demography, procedure, 
and personnel) the administrative burden has been far greater 
than in Michigan federal court, and where extensive Batson 
hearings and reversals have been far more common. 
Even in their own court, however, the prosecutors can find 
an excellent example of how probing an investigation a careful 
judge may have to conduct to follow Batson conscientiously. In 
*Professor, University of Michigan School of Law, Ann Arbor. 
' Professor Friedman's original essay ''An Assymetrical Approach to the Problem 
of Peremptories," appeared at 28 Crim. L. Bull. 507 (Nov./Dec. 1992). The 
rebuttal appeared at 30 Crim. L. Bull. 242 (May/June 1994). This reply is based on 
one that first appeared as "Prosecutors' Peremptory Challenges-A Response and 
Reply,'' 37 Law Quadrangle Notes 44 (University of Michigan Law School Spring 
1994). 
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Echlin v. LeCureux, 2 Judge A vern Cohn held six days of hearings 
before granting habeas corpus on the ground that a state prosecu-
tor had discriminatorily exercised peremptories. The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed, 3 but only by using a rather dubious avoidance 
mechanism, denying the petitioners standing on the ground that 
Powers v. Ohio,4 one of the progeny of Batson, created a "new 
rule'' and could not be applied retroactively. 
Echlin is not atypical. Many courts have limited the burden 
imposed by Batson by doing their best to avoid the case. Some 
use the same approach as in Echlin. More commonly, courts 
avoid difficulty by according extremely hospitable treatment to 
the reasons proffered by counsel, particularly prosecutors, for 
exercising their peremptories. Some of these reasons-' 'That 
juror was scowling at me,'' 5 seem dubious and easy to manufac-
ture. Others-"It wasn't that the juror is Hispanic; it was that 
she speaks Spanish and so would listen to the actual testimony 
rather than to the transcript"6-should not pass the "straight 
face" test. 
Thus, I have difficulty with the idea that the rule of Batson 
creates a ''conceptual mess' ' but not a practical mess. There are 
doctrines on which this ''tough in theory, easy in practice'' type 
of argument might have some force-doctrines for which the 
difficult conceptual issues arise only occasionally, out on the 
fringes where law professors love to roam. Batson is different. 
Take, as a straightforward example, a criminal case with a black 
defendant. Any time the prosecutor peremptorily challenges a 
black juror, a potential Batson issue arises. How can we be 
satisfied that race did not enter into the decision? By offering 
peremptories, we invite prosecutors to indulge their hunches as 
to how a potential juror will likely behave. But then we tell them 
that they must put out of mind one of the most critical facts about 
that person, one that may critically affect the juror's perspective 
on the world and the relationship of the state to the individual. 
This makes the exercise of peremptories, as well as the doctrine 
governing them, incoherent. 
2 Echlin v. LeCureux, 800 F. Supp. 515 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 
3 Echlin, 995 F. 2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1993). 
4 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
5 See United States v. Jenkins, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 7937 (Apr. 11, 1995). 
6 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 
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Aside from race, gender and religion are also crucial facts 
that a party predicting a juror's attitudes in a given case may 
well wantto know. Last year, in J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B. ,1 
the Supreme court held that Batson applies to peremptories based 
on gender; thus, the problem of incoherence has been extended 
and aggravated. But several state courts have said that Batson 
does not apply to peremptories based on religion, and in Davis 
v. Minnesota, 8 the Court apparently signaled that it agreed with 
them. The Minnesota Supreme Court, deciding before J. E. B. , 
had based its refusal to apply Batson to religiously based peremp-
tories, in part on its belief that Batson would not be extended 
beyond race; over a dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice 
Scalia, the Supreme Court denied certiorari without even re-
manding for reconsideration in light of J. E. B. 9 The implication 
of this line of cases is particularly troublesome: It is hard to look 
benignly on blatant sex or religious discrimination in a context, 
jury selection, that the Court has actively sought to rid of racial 
discrimination. 
Perhaps the courts will continue in large part to avoid the 
consequences of this incoherence by turning their eyes away 
from violations of Batson principles. We ought to be suspicious 
of a rule when one argument for it is that it is widely ignored. 
These difficulties would all be tolerable if there were any 
compelling need to allow prosecutors to exercise peremptory 
challenges. I do not believe there is. Wisely, my prosecutorial 
critics do not appear to argue strongly that prosecutorial peremp-
tories are necessary to prevent inaccurate pro-defendant verdicts. 
Rather, they emphasize the harm that an outlier, perhaps an 
irrational juror, might do by causing a hung jury. 
I agree that this is a problem that must be addressed. Most 
often, though, one outlier will not be enough to hang a jury. 10 
7 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). 
8 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994). 
9 Justice Ginsburg took the unusual step of writing an opinion concurring in the 
denial of certiorari, pointing to reasons cited by the Minnesota court supporting its 
decision. 
10 My understanding is that usually-though of course not inevitably-one or two 
holdouts ~n a jury of twelve do not cause the jury to hang; the pressure to go along 
becomes mtense. Note also that unanimity among twelve-member juries is not 
constitutionally required even in criminal trials. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 
(1972). 
339 
CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN 
Perhaps more significantly, relying on the prosecutor to address 
the problem, and on a peremptory basis no less, is the wrong 
way to go. It gives an advocate a blunderbuss, when what is 
needed is judicial use of a scalpel. For one thing, most often, 
prosecutors do not use their peremptories to remove outliers, 
and it is not at all clear that they would be particularly good at it 
anyway. Federal prosecutors ordinarily get six peremptories; in 
picking a jury of twelve, there cannot, by definition, even be 
that many outliers-because if there were that many, they would 
not be outliers. Prosecutors, I believe, use most of their perempto-
ries the way defense lawyers do-for comparison shopping. 
Furthermore, if a venire member exhibits characteristics 
making him or her unlikely to be an adequate juror, the trial 
judge should be persuadable of that fact. If the judge-taking 
into account the interest that the court and the prosecutor share 
in preventing a hung jury-is not persuaded, why should an 
advocate's peremptory contrary desire carry the day? 
Thus, I conclude that, while defense peremptories are impor-
tant, prosecutorial peremptories are not worthwhile. This leads 
me to advocate an asymmetrical solution. Asymmetries in our 
rules of criminal justice should not be adopted out of softheaded 
sympathy for the defendant. Rather, they should be adopted only 
when justified by the fact that the defendant and the prosecution 
that seeks to punish him are in asymmetrical positions with 
respect to the adjudication. Current law in the federal courts 
and in many state systems usually gives more peremptories to 
defendants than to prosecutors. Thus I do not even suggest 
creating a new asymmetry; I would merely extend one that 
already exists. 
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